The Tit-for-Tat model of reciprocity (Axelrod & Hamilton 1981) , based on a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game, is limited to interactions between two individuals. Recently, Enquist & Leimar (1993) presented a model in which individuals could change partners (see also Dugatkin & Wilson 1991) . Their analysis showed that mobility seriously restricts the evolution of cooperation. A mobile 'free-rider' that did not reciprocate could successfully exploit a population of cooperators.
Here I describe a strategy by which individuals can manipulate their mobile partner's optimal strategy from defection to cooperation by dividing benefits into parcels. While Enquist & Leimar's (1993) model considers the effect of different values of mobility on the evolution of cooperation, the parcelling model assumes values of mobility that would favour defection if parcelling did not occur. In the parcelling model, individuals are not in a Prisoner's Dilemma and cheating is not a profitable option. The parcelling model was developed originally to explain egg-trading in simultaneous hermaphrodites (Connor 1990 (Connor , 1992 see also Friedman & Hammerstein 1991) . Here I illustrate and extend the parcelling model using Hart & Hart's (1992) description of reciprocal allogrooming among impala, Aepyceros melampus.
Impala allogroom by making upward sweeping motions of the tongue or lower incisors against the pelage of the head or neck of another individual (Hart & Hart 1992; Hart et al. 1992) . Each upward sweep of the tongue or lower incisors is called an episode and allogrooming occurs in bouts of 6-12 episodes. Partners do not groom each other simultaneously but take turns giving bouts of grooming in a highly reciprocal manner (Hart & Hart 1992) . In a typical interaction, from six to 12 bouts are exchanged; each individual receives three to six bouts.
One proposed benefit of being groomed in impala is tick removal (Hart & Hart 1992; Hart et al. 1992) . Hart & Hart (1992) suggest several potential costs to grooming, including energy loss, water and electrolyte loss from saliva expended, reduced predator vigilance and tooth wear. Allogrooming occurs among unrelated impala, and Hart & Hart make a convincing case that allogrooming is costly to the groomer and beneficial to the recipient.
In the parcelling model, each individual has a resource the other needs, and resources cannot be traded simultaneously (Connor 1992) . In impala the resource is a service: tick removal. After receiving a bout of grooming, an individual has three choices: defect by doing nothing, defect by seeking a new grooming partner, or return a grooming bout in anticipation of receiving another. The parcelling model assumes that the first option is not profitable; individuals that do not initiate or reciprocate bouts of grooming will enjoy an occasional free bout of grooming but this benefit will be outweighed by the cost of an increasing parasite load. An individual thus gains by receiving, at minimum cost to itself, a number of grooms per unit time that exceeds some 'threshold' value. After receiving a bout of grooming, an individual that will gain from further grooming has two options: reciprocate a bout of grooming to its current partner in anticipation of receiving another bout, or leave to solicit a bout of grooming from another individual. The recipient will reciprocate grooming if the benefit of staying (BS) less the cost of staying (CS) is larger than the benefit of leaving (BL) less the cost of leaving (CL): BS CS>BL CL. The cost of staying is the cost of grooming the partner; the benefit of staying is the grooming subsequently received from the partner, devalued by the probability that the partner will defect. The cost of leaving is the cost of initiating a new interaction with a different individual and the benefit is the grooming received once the new interaction is
